Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.
INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the Ramsey problem of optimal factor taxation under commitment in an infinite horizon framework that deviates from a first-best representative agent economy in two important aspects. First, to raise revenues, the government must use distortionary, second-best taxation. Following research along the lines of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) , we assume that proportional taxes on wages and capital income are the only tax instruments for financing some exogenously specified sequence of government expenditures. Second, the economy is characterized by imperfectly competitive labour markets. Specifically, we consider a multisector economy with a decentralized bargaining structure in which households have some wage-setting power. Within this structure, wages are set with a mark-up compared with a fully competitive outcome, leading at the aggregate level to a socially suboptimal employment outcome.
1 Importantly, the institutional set-up that generates this inefficiency is taken as given by the Ramsey planner when designing the mix of factor taxes, implying that corrective taxes or subsidies are the only channel to address the labour market distortion. In other words, we envisage a second-best economy in which policy-makers perceive the implementation of direct labour market reforms as particularly costly, while there is scope to adjust the tax system, conditional on the labour market imperfections.
As shown in seminal studies by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) , the first distortion resulting from restrictions on the set of available taxes, if taken in isolation, requires under broad assumptions that the long-run second-best tax rate of capital income should be zero, while the labour tax rate should be positive. With capital acting as an input in an intertemporal framework, this result can be seen as an implication of the production efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) , which states that it is inefficient to tax intermediate inputs if the final consumption goods can be taxed directly. The purpose of this paper is to show that this reasoning requires some modification if labour markets are assumed to be imperfectly competitive. To this end, we consider a wage bargaining structure in which the representative firm is 'small', in the sense that individual investment decisions of firms are made in a non-strategic manner with respect to the wage bargain. However, the aggregate capital stock nevertheless acts period by period as a crucial input for the wage-setting process. This feature drives a wedge between the return rates to capital as perceived by the private sector and by the tax authority. This, in turn, as we discuss from two perspectives, tends to invalidate the result of a steady-state zero capital tax, making it instead advisable to use both tax instruments.
First, we consider a constellation in which, in a first-best sense, wage subsidies should be used to counteract the effects of wage mark-ups. However, from the second-best perspective adopted in this paper, the two distortions impose conflicting demands on the wage tax, i.e. a positive wage tax in line with the objective of generating revenues under distortionary taxation and a wage subsidy in order to correct for the labour market inefficiency. Addressing this 'conflict', our results indicate an interesting hierarchy of the use of the two tax instruments. In line with the Chamley-Judd result, the labour tax is shown to bear the brunt of the revenue motive while a non-zero capital tax rate should be used, whenever possible, as a second-best tool to address the distortion in the labour market. More specifically, we establish that if the wage mark-up depends on the size of the capital stock a non-zero capital tax rate should assist the corrective taxation motive by mitigating the mark-up pricing of wage setters. These findings are broadly in line with Guo and Lansing (1999) and Judd (1997 Judd ( , 2002 , who stress the importance of discrepancies between private and social returns to capital and establish a role for second-best corrective capital taxation under imperfectly competitive product markets. Yet, there is an interesting twist to this because the focus of these papers is not on labour market imperfections. Moreover, Judd (2002) offers the conjecture that 'while labour markets may also be imperfectly competitive due to unionization, union mark-ups are similar to labourincome taxation and do not create exploding distortions between social and private costs ' ( p. 419) . Our analysis offers a counter-example to this conjecture because in our set-up, discrepancies between private and social costs of capital are triggered by a distortion that is directly linked to the introduction of union mark-ups in an otherwise standard setting.
Second, by modifying some details of the labour market specification, we derive a more general constellation in which the employment level resulting from the bargain does not depend on the wage tax, i.e. labour earns a rent. Assuming that these rents cannot be fully taxed, the capital tax should be used to counteract the creation of rents. This finding is in line with Correia (1996) and Jones et al. (1997) , who also allow for the possibility of rents in dynamic Ramsey settings, although not in the context of imperfectly competitive labour markets.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, as a simple and transparent benchmark, we consider an economy with decentralized monopolistic wage setting along the lines of Gali (1995 Gali ( , 1996 . Wages are set with a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Using this wage-setting condition in the implementability constraint of the Ramsey problem, we conclude that a non-zero capital tax should be used whenever the wage elasticity of labour demand and, thus, the mark-up is not constant, but rather varies with the capital intensity of production. Second, extending this benchmark economy, we allow for a right-to-manage bargaining framework along the lines of Layard et al. (1991) in which both firms and workers have some bargaining power and in which the outcome of the bargain depends on the level of unemployment benefits and the aggregate unemployment rate. Using the first-order condition of this bargaining structure in the implementability constraint, the optimal tax schedule is shown to depend in particular on how unemployment benefits are specified. As long as benefits are not proportional to the net wage, the qualitative findings of the benchmark economy carry over to the bargaining framework. Intuitively, this is the case because under this specification the labour market allocation resulting from the bargain depends on both the labour tax and the wage elasticity of labour demand, as in the benchmark economy. Hence, there is scope for a capital tax (or subsidy) to assist the corrective taxation motive if the mark-up varies with the capital intensity of production. By contrast, if benefits are proportional to the net wage, the labour market allocation no longer responds to changes in the wage tax, consistent with the findings of Pissarides (1998) . Consequently, there emerges a rent in the labour market. If it is assumed that the rent cannot be fully taxed away, the capital tax rate should be used as a tool for preventing the creation of rents, thereby establishing a second source of a non-zero capital tax.
In the remainder of the paper, we proceed as follows: Section 2 establishes the notation and presents the main findings within a simple benchmark economy with monopolistic wage setting. Section 3 allows for a richer rightto-manage wage bargain and highlights the importance of the specification of unemployment benefits for the optimal design of steady-state factor taxes. Section 4 discusses our main findings in the context of related literature. Section 5 offers some conclusions.
OPTIMAL FACTOR TAXES UNDER MONOPOLISTIC WAGE SETTING
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which infinitely lived households have preferences over consumption and leisure. There is one good that can be equally consumed or invested, and the aggregate production technology is characterized by constant returns to the two inputs labour and capital. The economy is in many ways standard, with the exception that decentralized labour markets are not fully competitive in so far as households have some market power when setting their wages, similar to Gali (1995 Gali ( , 1996 .
2 Specifically, there exist a large number of perfectly symmetric sectors, and any such sector is small in comparison with the aggregate economy. The latter feature offers a convenient short-cut to reduce strategic aspects of wage setting to a sequence of tractable static decision problems.
Description of the economy
The economy consists of a continuum of households and firms, each being of measure 1. The representative household has in every period t a constant and divisible time endowment L e 5 1 that the household divides between leisure L t and employment N t .
3 Aggregate output (Y t ) is produced according to the constant returns to scale technology Y t 5 F(K t , N t ), where K t denotes the capital stock and the function F is assumed to be increasing, continuously differentiable and strictly concave.
4 Capital depreciates at the constant rate dA(0, 1). Capital investment of firms is undertaken one period in advance, i.e. K t is a predetermined variable. Because the investment decision of any single firm has a negligible effect on the aggregate capital stock, firms take the correctly foreseen sequence of factor prices as given, leading to the usual firstorder conditions for factor prices
where w t and r t denote the gross wage rate and the gross return rate on capital, respectively. Because of constant returns to scale, firms make zero profits and all factor incomes are paid out to households. For any predetermined level of K t , equations (1) and (2) do not yet determine in a representative period t the employment level N t , i.e. some additional behavioural assumption is needed that specifies the labour supply. To establish a clear-cut benchmark, we assume for the remainder of this section that households have monopoly power in wage setting. 5 Notice that (1) defines implicitly an aggregate labour demand schedule
which describes for any given level of K t combinations of employment and wages consistent with competitive employment decisions by firms. We consider a sequence of short-run equilibria in which households choose in every period t their preferred combination of wages and employment along this schedule by charging a monopolistic mark-up of wages over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. For simple tractability, we assume that households focus exclusively on this within-period tradeoff between wages and employment, thereby ignoring intertemporal feedbacks between wage decisions and the evolution of the capital stock over time. To rationalize this type of myopic wage setting, we consider a set-up with a large number of perfectly symmetric sectors, with any such sector assumed to be small in comparison with the aggregate economy. Within each sector, households are collectively organized in a trade union, acting as monopolistic wage setters. Wages are set for one period, anticipating competitive employment decisions by firms at the chosen wage rate. In a symmetric equilibrium, all sectors will be characterized by the same wage rate and aggregate employment will then be determined by (3). Moreover, consistent with w t and N t , the resulting economy-wide rate of return on capital r t , which is beyond the control of the representative union, will be determined by (2). Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events that characterizes a symmetric 5. This assumption, while offering a particularly tractable case of wage bargaining, may be seen as rather extreme. To this end, Section 3 considers an extended and more realistic right-tomanage wage-bargaining framework in which both firms and households decide over the wage. In sum, without introducing explicit game-theoretic notation, the simple tractability of the following analysis rests on two key assumptions. (i) Within each sector, firms are too small to behave in a strategic manner vis-à-vis the outcome of the wage-setting process, i.e. we abstract from the hold-up problem that arises under firm-specific wage bargaining. (ii) Within the aggregate economy, the representative sector is of negligible size such that the representative union does not internalize the effects of its wage decisions on capital income and future factor prices. This feature makes the aggregate labour market outcome inefficient. Yet, assuming non-cooperative and decentralized wage setting across all sectors, it is rational for the representative union to exert its monopoly power within its own sector in a myopic manner.
Generally speaking, these assumptions can be justified from two perspectives. First, in the empirical literature, going back to Calmfors and Driffill (1988) , set-ups of this type are frequently used to explain why aggregate unemployment rates under decentralized wage-bargaining structures are typically higher than under centralized bargaining structures that tend to internalize intertemporal feedback effects. Second, from a technical viewpoint, these assumptions facilitate the analysis considerably because the strategic dimension of the labour market imperfection reduces to a sequence of static decision problems.
6 Moreover, these assumptions ensure that the (for predetermined K t ) Figure 1 Sequence of events in representative period t 6. In other words, the analysis abstracts from the possibility of coordinated wage-setting decisions across sectors that would internalize intertemporal effects of wage demands on investment decisions over time at the aggregate level, thereby recognizing the dependence of the 'location' of the labour demand schedule on past investment decisions. Evidently, to address such issues would require an explicit game-theoretic framework, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
specification is naturally linked to a fully competitive set-up. In particular, with Z ðN; KÞ ¼ ÀN w w=N denoting the wage elasticity of labour demand, the specification turns into the standard competitive case as Z tends to infinity. In every period, the government finances a constant stream of government expenditures G40, providing no utility to the representative household. The set of available tax instruments is restricted to proportional taxes on labour income ðt N t Þ and capital income (t K t ). Moreover, the government issues oneperiod bonds, yielding the flow budget constraint of the government
where R t denotes the gross return on a bond issued in period t and redeemed in period t þ 1. Let C t denote the consumption level of the household in period t. Then, the resource constraint of the economy is given by
Preferences of households are time separable, and the flow utility u(C, L) is increasing, differentiable, strictly concave and, for further simplification, separable in leisure and consumption, i.e. u CL 5 0. The objective of the household is to maximize
where bA(0, 1) denotes the discount factor. Households consider tax-exempt government bonds and claims on physical capital as perfect substitutes, implying the no-arbitrage condition
If one defines and normalizes the discount factors as
the present-value budget constraint of the household can be written as
where K 0 and B 0 are initial holdings of capital and bonds and t K 0 is the initial capital tax rate. A symmetric equilibrium of monopolistic wage setting in all sectors requires that (6) will be maximized over C and w subject to (3) and (7). (10) denotes the mark-up of net wages over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. 7 For future reference, it will be helpful to shed some light on the determinants of the wage mark-up. Let k 5 K/N denote the capital intensity of production and, for illustration, consider a CES production function with constant returns to scale
where 0oao1 is the distribution parameter and s is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Exploiting well-known properties of the CES production function, we provide the following summary for future reference:
Lemma. Under the constant returns to scale CES production function, the mark-up of the net wage over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is a function of the capital intensity, with
Remark. For a derivation, see Appendix A, Part 1.
Hence, the wage mark-up M will be constant if the wage elasticity of labour demand Z is independent of the capital intensity. As is well known, this will be satisfied for the special case of a Cobb-Douglas function (s 5 1). However, under gross complementarity (so1), a higher capital intensity increases the wage elasticity of labour demand (because the factor complementary to labour is now relatively more abundant) and, thus, reduces the wage 7. Of course, for a well-defined optimization problem, the usual transversality conditions for the stocks of capital and government bonds need to be satisfied as well.
mark-up. Conversely, under gross substitutability (s41), the effect is of an opposite nature, i.e. a higher capital intensity reduces the wage elasticity of labour demand and, thus, increases the wage mark-up.
Optimal steady-state taxation
Given the revenue requirements implied by the sequence of government expenditures, the tax authority is assumed to set its instruments in a manner that maximizes the utility of the representative household. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983) , it has become common practice to solve this type of dynamic Ramsey problem by means of the primal approach, which expresses the choice problem of the government in terms of quantities. Using the firstorder conditions (8)- (10) to substitute out for prices and taxes in the intertemporal budget constraint of the representative household, one obtains the 'implementability' constraint:
When maximizing (6) subject to (5) and (12), let f denote the value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability constraint. Moreover, let
and rewrite the objective of the primal approach compactly as
With K 0 , B 0 and some fixed initial capital tax rate t K 0 being given, the firstorder conditions of this 'pseudo-planning problem' can be calculated as follows:
N t : V N ðtÞ ¼ Ày t F N ðtÞ ð 17Þ
8. As discussed further below, because the time-zero capital stock can be taxed without deadweight loss, some restriction with respect to t K 0 typically needs to be imposed in order to ensure that the implementability constraint is binding. 
where
Note that equation (15) captures the standard intertemporal tradeoff described by the Euler equation from the household's optimization problem as long as V K (t þ 1) 5 0. By contrast, V K (t þ 1) 6 ¼ 0 indicates that the returns to investments in physical capital as perceived by the private sector and the Ramsey planner no longer coincide. For the remainder of this analysis, we follow the literature in assuming that there exists a solution to the Ramsey problem that converges to a time-invariant allocation, giving rise to a unique combination of steady-state factor taxes. Schedules for optimal taxes can be recovered by combining the first-order conditions of the pseudo-planning problem and the household. Specifically, by using the steady-state versions of (9) and (15), one obtains for the optimal capital income tax rate
Analogously, combining the steady-state versions of (10), (16) and (17) yields for the optimal labour tax rate
2.2.1. Two benchmark results on steady-state taxation To gain an intuitive understanding of the forces that shape the second-best optimal mix of factor taxes under monopolistic wage setting, it seems helpful, initially, to summarize two clear-cut benchmark results known from the literature.
Proposition 1. First-best factor taxes and imperfectly competitive labour markets: If the implementability constraint is not binding (f 5 0) and labour markets are imperfectly competitive (M41), the unconstrained socially optimal allocation can be implemented by subsidizing labour at the rate t N 5 1 À Mo0 and leaving capital untaxed (t K 5 0).
Remark. The unconstrained socially optimal allocation is given by the solution of the problem ( P) of the social planner:
Denote this solution by f c K t ; c N t ; c C t g and assume f 5 0 in the Ramsey problem of maximizing (14). Then, f c K t ; c N t ; c C t g solves (14) as well, and t K 5 0, t N 5 1 À Mo0 follows from (20) to (22). For the conjecture f 5 0 to be valid, however, at the prices associated with the allocation f c
needs to be satisfied.
Proposition 1 summarizes basic insights from the static literature on labour market imperfections. From the first-order conditions of the unconstrained problem ( P), it is evident that a welfare-maximizing social planner would seek to implement a steady-state allocation that is characterized by the optimality conditions
To replicate these conditions in an imperfectly competitive equilibrium, taxes have to be set according to t N 5 1 À Mo0 and t K 5 0, as to be inferred from the first-order conditions (9) and (10) of the representative household. This means that the inefficiency associated with monopolistic wage setting should be cured by subsidizing wages at a flat rate, while leaving capital untaxed. According to (20)- (22), this will indeed be optimal from the Ramsey perspective if the implementability constraint is non-binding (f 5 0). This in turn requires, as summarized by (23), that the government's initial net lending position vis-à-vis the private sector is sufficiently strong (i.e. B 0 sufficiently negative) or that the initial tax on capital t K 0 is sufficiently large to ensure that the entire sequence of future government expenditures (inclusive of the corrective wage subsidies) can be financed without resorting to distortionary taxes. 9 We turn now to constellations in which the unconstrained social optimum cannot be implemented and present the second benchmark result.
9. If (23) holds as a strict inequality, the difference between the initial wealth position of the government and the present value of its expenditures needs to be rebated to households in a lump-sum manner. Part (i) of Proposition 2 restates the result by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) that in a fully competitive setting under second-best taxation, it is too costly to distort the intertemporal margin of optimality, making the labour tax the preferred instrument. Note, however, the well-known tension between the time-zero capital tax rate (to be set as high as possible in order to reduce the shadow value f of the implementability constraint) and the steady-state result of a zero capital tax rate.
10 Moreover, equations (21) and (22) show that the steady-state level of the labour tax that corresponds to the Chamley-Judd capital taxation result typically cannot be inferred from steady-state quantities alone. Instead, it depends through the value of the implementability constraint f on the entire sequence of equilibrium conditions and the initial wealth positions, as discussed in further detail by Chamley (1985 Chamley ( , 1986 and Lucas (1990) . The separability assumption u CL 5 0, however, is a particularly simple sufficient condition for the steady-state value of t N to be always positive, ensuring that the entire steady-state tax burden falls on labour.
2.2.2. Second-best optimal steady-state factor taxes and imperfectly competitive labour markets Building on these two benchmark results, we now discuss a constellation with imperfectly competitive labour markets (M41) under distortionary, secondbest taxation requirements (f40). In the light of the lemma established above, we distinguish between wage mark-ups that are constant or, alternatively, depend on the capital intensity of production.
Proposition 3. Second-best factor taxes and imperfectly competitive labour markets: Assume that the implementability constraint is binding (f40) and wages are set with a mark-up M41.
(i) If M41 is constant (as implied by the Cobb-Douglas case with s 5 1), then
and, ceteris paribus, t N will be larger (smaller) than in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production if so1 (41).
Regarding part (i) of Proposition 3, the term 1/M in equation (22) indicates, ceteris paribus, the desirability of correcting for the labour market distortion.
10. Related to this tension, Lansing (1999) shows that under the specific assumption of logarithmic utility (which removes anticipation effects of changes in future return rates) and a balanced budget requirement (which removes the possibility to 'store' distortionary taxation revenues), the front loading of distortionary taxation ceases to be optimal, implying that t K 40 in the long run.
However, as long as the mark-up M is constant, the labour market distortion cannot be indirectly alleviated by taxing or subsidizing capital. Clearly, as assumed in part (ii) of Proposition 3, this is different if M(k) depends on the mix of factor inputs. Then, since M k 5 M k /N 6 ¼ 0, taxing or subsidizing capital income can be used as an indirect tool for mitigating the wage-setting power of households in the labour market. More precisely, capital should be taxed (subsidized) whenever the mark-up rises (falls) in the capital stock, or, equivalently, whenever s41 (so1). Corresponding to this finding, since M K enters the expressions for t K and t N with opposite signs, the labour tax should be used in an offsetting manner, which is to say that, ceteris paribus, labour should be less (more) strongly taxed than in the case of a constant mark-up whenever s41 (so1).
In sum, the main finding of this section is that in a Ramsey setting with imperfectly competitive labour markets, the role of capital taxation tends to be aligned with the corrective taxation rather than the revenue motive, as long as there are no rents accruing to labour. Qualitatively, this confirms the findings of Guo and Lansing (1999) , who, building on Judd (1997) , study optimal tax policies in a setting with imperfectly competitive intermediate product markets. However, the analysis of Guo and Lansing differs from ours in two key aspects: (i) the considered deviation from perfect competition affects the two inputs labour and capital in a perfectly symmetric manner; (ii) because of their monopoly power, intermediaries earn pure economic profits that are treated for tax purposes, in the absence of a genuine profit tax, as capital income. The first-best policy ('corresponding to f 5 0') is shown to consist of a uniform subsidy to both labour and capital, reflecting the first difference. From a second-best taxation perspective, the tax on labour is positive, while the sign of the steady-state capital tax rate is ambiguous owing to the 'underinvestment' and the 'profit' effect, reflecting the second difference. This latter finding is conceptually in line with our Proposition 3. However, in our analysis, in the absence of pure profits, the source of the ambiguity of the sign of the second-best capital tax rate is different, i.e. capital may need to be taxed or subsidized in order to mitigate the wagesetting power of households, depending on whether in the aggregate production function the elasticity s is assumed to be larger or less than unity.
OPTIMAL TAXATION UNDER RIGHT-TO-MANAGE WAGE BARGAINING: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
This section extends the previously studied economy and allows for a richer and less 'one-sided' wage-setting process in which both firms and households decide on the wage and in which the outcome of the bargain depends on the level of unemployment benefits and the aggregate unemployment rate, much as in Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 2) . Because versions of this set-up have been widely used in the past to study labour market issues in economies in which a Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining r 2008 The Authors 147 large part of the workforce earns wages that result from collective wagebargaining agreements, we find it natural to proceed along these lines. Given our discussion in Section 2, however, it will become clear that qualitatively the results derived below are not restricted to this particular extension. Specifically, we now assume that within each sector firms and households are organized in an employer's federation and a union, respectively, and we consider a representative, sector-specific bargain of the right-to-manage type that determines w, while the employment level is decided by firms. Conceptually, this modification implies that the monopolistic wage markup in the first-order condition (10) will now be replaced by a richer expression, describing the outcome of the right-to-manage bargain in a symmetric equilibrium.
The representative household has in each period a time endowment of L e 5 1, which, for simple tractability, is now assumed to be inelastically supplied. Wage contracts last for one period and, depending on the outcome of the bargain, a fraction N of households will be employed at the net wage rate w(1 À t N ), while a fraction 1 À N remains unemployed and receives benefits b. As above, there is no strategic interaction between the wage-setting decision and the process of capital formation, because firms within each sector are 'small', i.e. the period-t wage bargain takes the sector-wide capital stock K t as given. Similarly, we maintain the assumption that the representative sector is of negligible size such that the bargain does not internalize the effects on capital income and future factor prices. As a novel feature, we introduce some turnover between the sectors to ensure that the wage-setting behaviour in the representative sector takes the aggregate employment situation into account as well. Along the lines of Layard et al. (1991) , the outside option (w) maintained in the representative bargain in period t is specified as
where u denotes the (expected) economy-wide unemployment rate, w e is the expected average wage rate across sectors and w with (1owo1/u) is a measure of turnover between sectors after the wage has been set.
11 Let the relative bargaining power of the union be denoted by g and consider the Nash bargain in period t, with t N , K and w taken as given:
11. If there is zero turnover across sectors (w ! 1/u), the outside option is determined solely by unemployment benefits. The relative importance of benefits decreases in job turnovers, i.e. it is smallest if there is complete turnover (w ! 1). For a more detailed discussion of the reduced-form equation (24) in a related model, focusing also on the sequence of events in short-run equilibrium similar to Figure 1 discussed above, see Kaas and von Thadden (2004) .
The first-order condition regarding the wage rate is given by
Because all sectors are identical, a symmetric equilibrium requires w e 5 w, u 5 1 À N, yielding the following expression for the surplus of the net wage over the outside option:
As we show in the following two subsections, the factor taxation results depend sensitively on how the level of unemployment benefits b is specified in the outside option w. To simplify the exposition, we restrict the analysis to the case of a CES production function with properties as established in Section 2.1.
Non-indexed unemployment benefits
We assume first that unemployment benefits b t are set at some exogenously specified level b40. Then, as derived in Part 2 of Appendix A, the net wage resulting from the bargain can be expressed as [upon using (27) in (26)]:
Equation (28) generalizes the set-up of the previous section as now the net wage depends on the wage elasticity of labour demand (Z), the unemployment benefit level (b), the relative bargaining power of the two sides ((1 À g)/g), the turnover between sectors (w) and the steady-state unemployment rate (u 5 1 À N). For further reference, we emphasize that the mark-up of the net wage over unemployment benefits declines, ceteris paribus, in the wage elasticity of labour demand. The total income of households obtained in the labour market (i.e. inclusive of unemployment benefits), denoted e w, is given by
Note that e w is independent of prices and taxes, which means that we can use it as an alternative to equation (10) 12 Upon these changes, the flow objective of the pseudo-planning problem becomes
Using (30) in (14), the following is obtained from the first-order condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to K tþ1 :
Combining this with the no-arbitrage condition from the consumer's problem, as given by (9), yields for the steady-state tax rate on capital:
Examining (31) leads to:
Proposition 4. If the implementability condition is binding (f40), the optimal steady-state tax rate on capital should be set according to
Remark. The result follows from x K 5 x k /N, sign(x k ) 5 sign(Z k ) and the properties of Z established for the Lemma in Section 2.1. Since e w x < 0, sign
Despite the different labour market specification, Proposition 4 essentially replicates the main finding of Proposition 3, which states that the steady-state capital tax should be non-zero whenever the wage elasticity of labour demand depends on the capital intensity of production. The main reason for this is as follows: although the labour supply is assumed to be inelastic at the individual level, employment is elastic at the sectoral level at which the representative wage bargain takes place. One of the key determinants of employment is the size of the mark-up of wages over unemployment benefits that depends, ceteris paribus, on the wage elasticity of labour demand. Hence, 12. More specifically, households offer their labour supply inelastically to the union that represents them in the bargain. Hence, by making the simplifying assumption u(C, 1 À N) 5 u(C), we assume that the disutility of labour does not depend on the employment status. This can be rationalized, for example, by assuming that benefits are handed out only in return for the participation in some training activity that keeps the human capital of unemployed people intact, but does not contribute to the per household output measure F(K, N). similar to Proposition 3, the long-run employment level may depend on the level of the capital stock, and, whenever this is the case, there is scope for a non-zero capital tax in line with the corrective taxation motive.
Unemployment benefits indexed to the net wage
Assume now that unemployment benefits are proportional to the net wage so that
Using equation (32), we obtain for the difference between the net wage rate and the outside option
Using (33) in (26), one can confirm that now the labour market allocation no longer depends on the labour tax rate t N , because changes in t N leave the relative importance of the inside and outside option unaffected, as discussed in more detail, for example, in Pissarides (1998) . More precisely, substituting (33) into (26) gives
where (35) defines implicitly a relationship between the levels of employment and capital. Hence, under the assumption of indexed unemployment benefits the total labour market income e w can be expressed as
Because the labour market allocations (34) and (35) are not affected by changes in t N , there is a rent accruing to labour that can be taxed away without deadweight loss, with the rent R being given by
Before we proceed, we point out that (36) is a generalization of the case of a rent considered in Jones et al. (1997) , who analyse an economy with a fully competitive labour market in which labour is in fixed supply (N 5 1) and l 5 0. Hence the rent in their model is simply the gross wage rate, i.e. R 5 w. Equation (36) generalizes this idea because the rate N at which labour is employed, although being independent of t N , is no longer fixed, but results instead from the bargain and depends on the capital intensity k t . Thus, the size of the rent to labour depends now on the wage rate w(k)
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and on the employment rate N(k). To keep the following analysis meaningful, we follow Jones et al. (1997) and assume that the rent cannot be fully taxed (because of some exogenous upper bound for the tax rate on labour t N ¼ t N < 1Þ and that in steady state the labour tax revenue t N R is not sufficient to cover all government expenditures. Hence, the flow objective and the Lagrangian of the pseudo-planning problem become, respectively,
The first-order condition of (38) with respect to K tþ1 is given by
Accordingly, the steady-state capital tax rate can be expressed as
where w 5 F N has been used in deriving (42). This leads us to Proposition 5. Under proportional unemployment benefits there exists a rent in the labour market. If this rent cannot be fully taxed (t N ¼ t N < 1) and the implementability constraint is binding (f40), the optimal steady-state capital tax rate t K is positive whenever the rent increases in the capital stock. This will always be the case for s 1, while the effect on t K is a priori ambiguous for s41.
Remark. According to (35), sign(x k ) 5 sign(N k ). Thus, N K ¼ N k ð1=NÞ ¼ 0 if s 5 1, and N K 40 (o0) if so1 (s41), while F NK 40 will be satisfied irrespective of how s relates to unity.
Proposition 5 is a generalization of the rent-result of Jones et al. (1997) , who show that the steady-state capital tax should be positive whenever the capital stock and the (non-fully taxable) rent are positively correlated, requiring in their set-up simply w K 5 F NK 40.
13 However, as a key difference, the total effect of the capital stock on the size of the rent can now be decomposed into a 'wage' and an 'employment' effect. In the special case of a Cobb-Douglas function (s 5 1), the employment rate consistent with the bargaining outcome is in 'fixed' supply, i.e. the employment effect is zero and, according to (42), t K 40 is obtained because w K 5 F NK 40, as in Jones et al. (1997) .
14 By contrast, if s 6 ¼ 1, the employment rate depends on the level of the capital stock. Under gross complementarity (so1), the steady-state employment rises in the capital stock, thereby increasing the rent, i.e. the two effects reinforce each other, calling unambiguously for a positive capital tax rate. Correspondingly, if s41 the two effects operate in different directions, making the overall effect a priori ambiguous.
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In sum, our results indicate that whenever the rent correlates positively with the long-run capital stock, the capital tax should be positive to counteract the rent-creation process. However, it should be stressed that our particular set-up, with only two inputs, suffers from the limitation that the assumption of a non-fully taxable rent automatically imposes some exogenous upper bound for the labour tax rate. We leave to future work a re-examination of the results of this final section in a setting that allows, for example, for a third input that cannot be taxed along the lines of Correia (1996) and, at the same time, maintains the notion of imperfectly competitive labour markets.
RELATED LITERATURE
This section discusses our main findings in the context of related literature.
First and most closely related to our paper, Domeij (2005) also analyses the role of labour market distortions for second-best optimal factor taxes in a dynamic setting with capital accumulation. However, different from our analysis, Domeij considers a set-up where search frictions generate unemployment and the paper shows that a non-zero capital tax is desirable if this 13. In related work, Correia (1996) considers a competitive economy with constant returns to scale in labour, capital and a third input that cannot be taxed and earns a rent. She shows that the steady-state tax rate on capital should be positive (negative) whenever capital and the third factor enter the production function as complements (substitutes), a finding that is qualitatively in accordance with the intuition given above. 14. The property w K 5 F NK 40 follows from the assumptions made at the outset regarding F(K, N) and it is always satisfied by a CES function, irrespective of the size of s. 15. This ambiguity, however, does not imply that under s41 the capital tax rate t K must be lower than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The reason for this is that the weights of the two effects depend on the replacement ratio l. Assume, for example, that l is 'high' (i.e. close to 1), ensuring a comparatively low level of steady-state employment. Then, the employment effect carries a low weight, while the wage effect associated with s41 may well outweigh the total effect under s 5 1.
Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining r 2008 The Authors tool can be used to correct for distortions linked to overly tight labour markets. Second, our steady-state results can be linked to static, open-economy frameworks in which the return to capital is taken as given from the world market and the capital (labour) endowment is assumed to be perfectly mobile (immobile). Richter and Schneider (2001) derive for the monopoly union case, similar to the reasoning behind our Proposition 3, a role of a non-zero capital tax rate as an indirect tool for reducing the wage-setting power of the union. 16 Similarly, Koskela and Schöb (2002) consider a labour market that is subject to right-to-manage wage bargaining and derive capital taxation results that have some resemblance to our Proposition 4.
Third, in the context of dynamic Ramsey problems, results on second-best optimal factor taxes are known to depend sensitively on the set of feasible tax instruments, as illustrated in Section 3.2. Along these lines, Coleman (2000) , on including the additional instrument of a consumption tax, derives a uniform taxation result regarding consumption and leisure (implying that labour should be subsidized at the rate of the consumption tax) that restores the unconstrained social optimum without compromising on the zero capital tax result.
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Fourth, we conclude with a brief account of recent contributions to the literature that establish alternative mechanisms that invalidate the ChamleyJudd taxation result.
18 (i) Erosa and Gervais (2002) show that in a life-cycle framework, optimal tax plans are likely to require different steady-state tax rates over an individual's lifetime. Assuming an increasing leisure profile over the life cycle of agents, the capital tax rate should be positive whenever agespecific tax schemes are not available. (ii) Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) , Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) address the wellknown time-inconsistency of the Chamley-Judd finding of a zero long-run capital tax, resulting from the fact that in any period the capital stock is in fixed supply. Imposing the time consistency of tax announcements as an additional constraint, simulation results reported in the three studies, however, disagree on whether sustainable, time-consistent plans call for 16. The taxation findings of Richter and Schneider (2001) for the CES case in Proposition 7 ( p. 254) differ from ours, however, because in their set-up profit-maximizing firms simultaneously choose optimal levels of labour and capital. By contrast, in our sequential set-up capital is a predetermined variable regarding the employment decision of firms. 17. Coleman's analysis can easily be adapted to our set-up discussed in Section 2. In particular, allowing for a constant consumption tax (t C ), equation (9) in the crucial first-order conditions of the household remains unaffected, while (10) turns into:
Owing to the additional tax instrument, the unconstrained social optimum can now be restored if taxes are set according to (1Àt N )/(1þt C ) 5 M. Whenever M41, one obtains À t N 4t C , i.e. the labour market distortion strengthens the need to subsidize labour and thereby overturns the uniform taxation result that holds in a fully competitive setting. 18. The following list is certainly not exhaustive. For more comprehensive overviews of the literature, see, for example, Atkeson et al. (1999) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch. 15) .
capital taxes or subsidies. (iii) Stressing distributional aspects, Garcia-Milà et al. (2001) evaluate the welfare consequences of lowering capital taxes in a model with heterogeneous agents. The main finding of the paper is that such a policy may well face a tradeoff between the higher aggregate efficiency in production and the redistribution of wealth against agents with a low ratio of capital income over labour income. With a similar intention, Krusell (2002) and Lansing (1999) establish a redistributive role of steady-state capital taxation in a set-up with heterogeneous agents that is similar to Judd (1985) , but imposes time-consistent policies. (iv) Introducing the notion of incomplete markets, Aiyagari (1995) considers a set-up in which agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing constraints. This motivates at the individual level precautionary savings, and the paper shows that a positive capital tax rate is required to prevent excessive capital formation. (v) Jones et al. (1997) show, within a human capital set-up in which (effective) labour has a stock component similar to physical capital, that it may well be optimal to set both capital and labour taxes equal to zero in the long run. 
CONCLUSION
This paper studies features of optimal factor taxes under commitment in a representative agent, infinite horizon economy in which factor taxes are the only available tax instruments for financing some exogenously given stream of government expenditures. Distinguishing our work from the ChamleyJudd tradition, however, the labour market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive in the sense that wage mark-ups resulting from a bargaining structure lead to a socially suboptimal employment level. To characterize second-best optimal taxes in line with these assumptions, we apply the logic of Ramsey-taxation exercises, i.e. we recognize that different tax schedules trigger different equilibrium reactions of agents, which in turn will be associated with different (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium allocations. According to this logic, a benign tax authority should choose the tax schedule that yields, in terms of the associated intertemporal allocation, the highest utility of the representative agent, taking as given the labour market constraint that it must be possible to decentralize the allocation through wage bargains. In other words, we assume that the tax authority cannot directly remove the labour market inefficiency. The main result of this paper is that the Chamley-Judd finding that calls in a steady state for a zero capital tax rate may well be invalidated under conditions of imperfectly competitive labour markets. At first sight, this result may seem surprising because the assumed deviations from perfect competition are seemingly unrelated to capital and restricted to the labour 19 . This implies that under such a scheme the government must acquire in the transition towards the steady-state claims against the private sector that, in steady state, yield sufficient interest earnings to cover all government expenditures. show that under a wage bargaining structure in which the representative firm is 'small' and investment decisions are made in a non-strategic manner, the aggregate capital stock nevertheless acts as an important input for the wagesetting process. Because of this feature, the return rates to capital as perceived by the private sector and by the Ramsey planner (i.e. the tax authority) are likely to be different. Specifically, we show how in such a constellation a non-zero capital tax can have a role in correcting for the labour market distortion by mitigating the mark-up pricing of wage setters. Second, we show that the Chamley-Judd result disappears when the wage bargaining specification gives rise to rents accruing to labour that cannot be directly taxed. In our set-up, this is the case if unemployment benefits are proportional to the net wage.
APPENDIX A Part 1
The CES production function (11) implies, using X ¼ aK Implicitly differentiating the first-order condition F N (K, N) 5 w, the wage elasticity of labour demand Z can be expressed as
Substituting out for F N and F NN and using k 5 K/N, Z turns out to be a function of the capital-labour ratio
Since M 5 Z(k)/(Z(k) À 1) falls in Z, for Z41, the sign of @M/@k as established in the Lemma follows immediately from (A1).
Part 2
Suppressing time indices, the first-order condition regarding the wage rate as given by (26) can be rearranged to express the net wage rate in terms of the outside option w:
where s ¼ wN=FðK; NÞ describes the labour share. In the special case of a CES production function, the labour share is given by the expression
Combining this with the expression for the wage elasticity of labour demand derived in (A1) gives s=ð1ÀsÞ ¼ ðZðkÞ À sÞ=s. Upon isolating w in (27) and substituting into (A2), one obtains equation (28) stated in the main text.
